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Abstract
While the evolution of cooperation has been widely studied, little attention has been devoted to adversarial settings
wherein one actor can directly harm another. Recent theoretical work addresses this issue, introducing an adversarial game
in which the emergence of cooperation is heavily reliant on the presence of ‘‘Informants,’’ actors who defect at first-order by
harming others, but who cooperate at second-order by punishing other defectors. We experimentally study this adversarial
environment in the laboratory with human subjects to test whether Informants are indeed critical for the emergence of
cooperation. We find in these experiments that, even more so than predicted by theory, Informants are crucial for the
emergence and sustenance of a high cooperation state. A key lesson is that successfully reaching and maintaining a low
defection society may require the cultivation of criminals who will also aid in the punishment of others.
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Introduction
The punishment of defectors is vital for sustaining cooperation
in social dilemmas [1–3]. Indeed, evidence reveals that humans
are willing to suffer personal losses in order to punish defectors [4–
7]. It is thus natural to ask how cooperation and punishment
coevolve, as well as if, and how, a society mired in a high incidence
of defection can transition to a cooperative state. Several works
propose various channels through which this evolution may occur
[1,2,8–14].
Yet, previous game theoretic and experimental research on
human cooperation has generally ignored settings with distinctly
adversarial characteristics, wherein one actor is uniquely posi-
tioned to harm another. This lacuna is puzzling given that such
settings better reflect the asymmetries inherent in many social
interactions and given the many sociological studies of adversarial
behavior within various societies. For example, consider criminal
activity, a prototypical adversarial interaction. Criminological
research has found that civilians play a crucial role in fostering
peaceful communities [15] and self-regulating pro-social norms
[16,17]. Conversely, crime is found to be rampant in disorganized
societies where a common understanding of norms and a shared
sense of responsibility are absent [18–22]. Fear of retaliation
against those who cooperate with authorities may be sufficiently
strong to undermine the enforcement of pro-social norms; both
victim and witness may fear retaliation and disengage from
cooperation with law enforcement, leaving criminal behavior to
proliferate [23–25].
Recent theoretical work [26,27] shifts the focus from standard
social dilemmas towards the emergence of cooperation in an
adversarial, criminal setting that incorporates the above sociolog-
ical considerations. The game-theoretic model presented in these
works considers two actors selected at random from a large
population of N individuals. Each is given an endowment yw0.
One actor, denoted player one, is placed in a potential criminal
role, while the other, denoted player two, is placed in a potential
victim role. As depicted in Fig. 1, the former decides whether or
not to ‘‘steal’’ an amount d (0vdvy) from the other, and the
latter decides whether or not to report such theft, if it occurs, to
authorities. If the victim does not report, the criminal keeps an
amount ad (0vaƒ1), with (1{a)d inefficiently lost during the
theft. On the other hand, if the victim does report, the criminal is
convicted and punished with probability r, which is equal to the
fraction of the total population that would also report under such
circumstances; with probability 1{r, therefore, the criminal is not
convicted. Importantly, a convicted criminal fully reimburses the
victim’s d loss and also pays an additional punishment cost h, while
the victim suffers an additional retaliation cost e in the case of an
unsuccessful reporting. Thus, reporting is a risky proposition for
the victim, as a reporting that leads to conviction returns the
victim’s endowment to y, but a reporting that fails to convict leaves
the victim worse off than if he or she hadn’t reported at all, due to
the retaliation cost e. Given the above model, each actor falls into
one of four strategies, P, A, I, or V, where
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P~00Paladin00~ not steal, reportf g,
A~00Apathetic00~ not steal, not reportf g,
I~00Informant00~ steal, reportf g
V~00Villain00~ steal, not reportf g:
The two-part strategy prescribes what the actor will do for either
role in which he or she is placed. Prior works [28,29] have
considered the effects of strategies analogous to the four listed
above, but in the framework of public goods games.
Mathematical analysis and simulations reveal that the Infor-
mant strategy (first-order defector, second-order cooperator) plays
a critical role in the coevolution of cooperation and punishment
when this adversarial interaction is repeated over the course of
many periods and actors are given the opportunity to adapt their
strategies over time in certain prescribed ways. Two steady states
can emerge over such repeated play: high crime, Villain-
dominated ‘‘Dystopia’’ or low crime, Paladin-dominated ‘‘Uto-
pia’’. Under an imitation strategy updating rule [26], the presence
of even a small number of Informants within the population is
often sufficient to guarantee that the system will end in Utopia,
even if the system is initiated very near Dystopia, regardless of
game parameters. Figure 2(A) displays results from a simulation
using this imitation updating rule, and shows the emergence of
cooperation in a society initialized near Dystopia but containing a
small number of Informants (90% Villains - 10% Informants). The
rise of Informants precedes that of Paladins, which eventually leads
to Utopia, a typical pattern replicated in these simulations. In
Fig. 2(C), however, the Informant strategy is not allowed and the
system does not reach Utopia, despite similar initial conditions
(90% Villains - 10% Paladins). Under a best response updating
rule [27], a small number of Informants is typically insufficient to
cause the system to converge to Utopia, but the availability of the
Informant strategy is nevertheless a necessary condition for the
evolution toward and maintenance of the Utopian state, albeit
only under favorable game parameters and initial conditions.
Although the main finding of this prior theoretical work – that
Informants are crucial to keeping criminal defection low – closely
mirrors anecdotal evidence gathered by law enforcement agencies,
there has been no systematic testing involving human subjects to
determine the exact role Informants play in promoting cooperative
behavior within a society. Our current work aims to shed light on
this issue by presenting the results of a series of behavioral science
experiments that were designed to mimic as closely as possible the
game outlined above, and that specifically address the question of
whether and how Informants may foster long-term cooperation.
Methods
We conducted 16 sessions under 10 different treatments of a
computer-based experiment at the Experimental Social Science
Laboratory at the University of California, Irvine; the experiment
was approved by UC Irvine’s Institutional Review Board (IRB)
under protocol HS# 2011-8378, with informed consent obtained
via the laboratory’s website and in-lab instructions. Budgetary
constraints forced us to implement a partial factorial over the
treatment variables of interest, which include differing initial
states, two different parameter profiles, and different combinations
of allowed strategies. Students enrolled at the university were
contacted via email advertisements to register to be in the
laboratory’s online subject pool. For each experimental session, an
email was sent to all eligible students in the subject pool, and
eligible students then signed-up for the session via the laboratory’s
web site. Each student was only allowed to participate in one of the
16 sessions; that is, a student was eligible if and only if he or she
had not yet participated in one of the prior conducted sessions of
the experiment. Every session started at 10:00AM and lasted about
an hour. Subjects showed up to the lab, signed in, proved their
identity by showing their student ID cards, and were assigned a
computer terminal. See Table S1 for aggregated information
about the subjects who participated in each session.
The experiment itself consists of three phases – instructions,
multiple rounds of decision making, and a questionnaire – and was
implemented using the z-Tree software package [30]. Our
experiment software is meant to imitate the adversarial game
described above. The experiment was designed to be free of
confounding ‘‘visual’’ variables, such as gender, race, age, etc.
Hence, the computer terminals are separated by dividers, which
abstract away any identifying features of other participants in the
room that might cause a bias upon decision making. The subjects
within each session advance through each screen together. That is,
the next screen in the experiment is not displayed until all of the
subjects in the session have clicked on the appropriate button
signaling that they are finished with the current screen.
The instructions inform the subjects about the basic structure of
the adversarial setting. They are told that they will be randomly
assigned into groups of two and randomly given a role of either
‘‘potential criminal’’ or ‘‘potential injured party’’. They are also
informed about how the points that they earn during the session
will be converted into real dollars that they will be payed at the
end of the experiment. Finally, they are asked a number of
questions to test their understanding of the game and the payoffs
associated with various scenarios.
The next phase involves multiple periods of decision making in
the adversarial setting. Each session lasts a minimum of 25 periods,
after which each successive period occurs with a 75% chance, with
a maximum of 35 periods. This end-game design creates
uncertainty about which period is the last, thereby reducing
concerns about idiosyncratic behaviors in the last period while still
guaranteeing that the session will end within the announced time.
Out of the 16 total sessions, 14 were initialized to specific states
for the first five periods of the experiment, in order to test how
different initial conditions might alter the outcome of the
experiment. To do this, the computer program randomly assigns
Figure 1. The adversarial interaction represented in a game
tree. The final payoffs in the format (player one, player two) are given
at the terminal nodes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061458.g001
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certain specified proportions of subjects to each of the four
strategies (Paladin, Apathetic, Informant, or Villain) in period one.
During the first five periods, the subject’s enforced choices are
shown on the screen, and are not allowed to be altered by the
subject. The subject is therefore aware of which strategy he or she
is being forced to play for the initialization periods. The
interactions and payoffs are recorded and shown to the subject
during the initialization period. In the 2 remaining sessions with
no initialization period, all subjects were allowed to choose their
strategy in the first period. We employed three different
initializations: 90% Villains - 10% Informants, 90% Villains -
10% Paladins, and 60% Villains - 40% Paladins. The first two
start the system very near Dystopia to see the role of Informants in
transitioning to Utopia. The third has a strong presence of
Paladins but, under the deterministic imitation dynamic [26], does
not converge to Utopia because Informants are missing.
Starting in the first period after initialization (period 6 in the 14
initialization sessions and period 2 in the no-initialization sessions),
subjects are allowed to choose whatever strategy they would like
(from the list of available strategies) at the beginning of each
period, constrained only by the level q of behavioral inertia chosen
for the experiment. This behavioral inertia randomly forces each
subject to play the same strategy as played in the last period with
probability q, i.i.d. across subjects. We enforce a non-zero level of
behavioral inertia to prevent rapid cycling between strategies and
to make choices more salient to the subjects, as they are aware that
whatever strategy they choose now may stick with them for an
extended period of time. Most sessions used q~0:3, but we also
ran two high inertia sessions with q~0:8 for robustness. As seen
later, this change in inertia slowed convergence but played no
other significant role.
Within each decision making period of the experiment, there is
a decision screen and a results screen, screen shots of which are
shown in Fig. 3. If a subject is allowed to select a strategy that
period, he or she does so by clicking one of four options: ‘‘NOT
STEAL if you are the Potential Criminal. REPORT if you are the
Injured Party.’’; ‘‘NOT STEAL if you are the Potential Criminal.
NOT REPORT if you are the Injured Party.’’; ‘‘STEAL if you are
the Potential Criminal. REPORT if you are the Injured Party.’’;
or ‘‘STEAL if you are the Potential Criminal. NOT REPORT if
you are the Injured Party.’’. These strategies align with Paladin,
Apathetic, Informant, and Villain, respectively. To prevent the
creation of unintended focality, each subject is shown these options
in a randomly determined order. This is done by randomly
assigning to each player an ‘‘order type’’, which determines the
order in which the strategies are presented to that subject, at the
beginning of the experiment. That is, one subject has the four
strategies displayed in a certain order, another has a different
order, and so on, but the order for a given subject remains fixed
during the duration of the experiment to avoid confusion. Once a
subject selects a strategy, he or she clicks a button labeled ‘‘OK’’ to
signal that he or she is ready to move on to the results screen.
Subjects who are not allowed to select a strategy for that period
because of behavioral inertia (or during the initialization periods)
are also required to click ‘‘OK’’ to signal that they are ready to
advance to the results screen.
After each subject has selected ‘‘OK’’ to move on to the results
screen, each participant is randomly and anonymously paired with
another participant, and the program randomly assigns the roles of
Figure 2. Comparisons of the strategy evolutions for the theoretical imitation dynamic (left figures) and two experimental sessions
(right figures). In (A) and (B), all strategies are allowed; in (C) and (D), Informants are disallowed. In all figures, Paladins are red circles, Apathetics are
blue squares, Informants are orange triangles, and Villains are green diamonds.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061458.g002
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‘‘potential criminal’’ (player one) and ‘‘potential injured party’’
(player two) within each pair. The program then plays out each
player’s strategy based on the assigned roles. Four possible
outcomes can occur. First, if player one selected to not steal
(Paladin or Apathetic), then both subjects receive their endowment
of y~100 for that period. Second, if player one selected to steal
(Villain or Informant) and player two selected to not report
(Apathetic or Villain), then player one receives yzad~130 and
Figure 3. Screen captures of the decision screen (top) and results screen (bottom) in our experimental software.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061458.g003
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player two receives y{d~55 (a~2=3, d~45 for both parameter
profiles employed in our study). If player one selected to steal
(Villain or Informant) and player two selected to report (Informant
or Paladin), then the outcome is stochastically dependent on
whether or not the criminal is convicted, which happens with
probability r, which is equal to the fraction of all players that chose
to play as either an Informant or Paladin. Thus, the third potential
outcome is that conviction occurs, wherein player one pays back d
to player two and pays an additional cost h, for a total payoff of
yzad{d{h~40 for player one (h~45 for both parameter
profiles) and y{dzd~100 for player two. The fourth potential
outcome is that no conviction occurs, wherein player one receives
yzad~130 and player two incurs an extra cost of e, for a total
payoff of y{d{e~45 in parameter Profile A and y{d{e~0 in
parameter Profile B (e~10 in Profile A and e~55 in Profile B).
Note that the only difference between parameter Profiles A and B
is in the additional retaliation cost for unsuccessful reporting, e. In
expectation, it is thus more costly to report in Profile B than in A.
Results
The top 5 entries in Table S2 provide information and
outcomes of experimental sessions that are representative of the
key patterns found across all 16 sessions; full results for each
session are detailed below. When all strategies are allowed (as in
Sessions 1 and 2), the subjects converge to Utopia, a result that is
robust across all studied treatment conditions. Figure 2(B) shows
the evolution of strategies from Session 1. Akin to what is observed
in the simulation data in Fig. 2(A), we see a rise in Informants that
precedes a rise in Paladins, which eventually leads to convergence
at Utopia. Though this is cursory evidence that the dynamic effect
Informants play in the experiments is similar to that predicted by
the imitation dynamic theory, we provide a stronger test of this
prediction by conducting sessions that disallow the Informant
strategy. Indeed, in such sessions (as in 3 and 4), the system
converges to Dystopia, a result that is, again, robust across all
studied treatment conditions. Figure 2(D) shows the evolution of
strategies from one such session, Session 3. To verify that
convergence to Dystopia in these sessions is not due merely to a
reduction in the strategy set, we examine Session 5, which excludes
Apathetics. As suggested by the imitation dynamic theory,
disallowing Informants prevents Utopia, but disallowing Apa-
thetics does not.
The crucial role played by Informants vis-a`-vis Utopia in the
experimental sessions qualitatively matches the theoretical results,
yet the data contain three striking patterns that reveal discrepan-
cies with the theoretical work. First, Informants are vital for the
emergence of Utopia under experiments performed with both
parameter profiles, despite starting from initial conditions in which
they should play no role under the theoretical best response
dynamic [27]. This may be due to inherent behavioral proclivities
of the subjects (e.g., a preference for reciprocity), which could
cause them to at least partially discount the initial conditions
forced upon them. Second, in Session 3, the subjects converge to
Dystopia despite coming close to Utopia early in the session, as
seen in Fig. 2(D). Here, 72% of the subjects are Paladins in periods
8 and 9, but the system thereafter experiences a rapid increase in
criminal defection that remains in place for the duration of the
session. The observed pattern suggests that Informants play a role
not just in helping the system initially transition to Utopia, but also
in keeping the system in Utopia once it is reached; this matches the
role of Informants in the best response dynamic, but not in the
imitation dynamic. Third, the majority-Villain Dystopia achieved
in the experiments differs from those predicted by theory: in the
experiments, the minority population are Paladins (see Fig. 2(D)),
while under the imitation dynamics, the minority population are
Apathetics (see Fig. 2(C)) and under best response there is no
minority population. Again, this may be due to subjects’ inherent
preferences for certain strategies, namely the Paladin.
To help visualize the role Informants play in transitioning a
population to Utopia and helping it remain there, we partition the
data into early (1–15) and late (16-end) periods and calculate the
number of instances in which a subject, when given the
opportunity to switch strategy, either keeps his or her current
strategy or chooses another. Figure 4(A) displays the observed
transition distributions from the early periods of Session 1,
ignoring Apathetics because they constitute a very small portion
of the observed strategies. Here, we observe that Villains switch to
Informants and Paladins at similar rates, but Informants
preferentially transition to Paladins rather than to Villains. In
effect, the Informant strategy provides a pathway by which
Villains become Paladins during the transition from Dystopia to
Utopia.
On the other hand, Fig. 4(B) displays the transition distributions
from the late periods of Session 1. The system is in Utopia, but
there is still noise and ‘‘mutation’’ as Paladins experiment with the
Informant strategy before switching back to Paladins; this occurs
far more frequently than the Paladin-Villain mutation. Observe
that Informant mutants, although increasing the occurrence of
crimes, still foster a high incidence of reporting, thereby sustaining
the Paladin strategy as the best response, and reinforcing the
Utopian state as the preferred equilibrium. Thus, Informants help
the system maintain Utopia once it is reached.
The dramatic effect of removing the Informant strategy is
evident in Figs. 4(C) and 4(D), which depict the transition
distributions from the early and late periods of Session 3,
respectively. In the absence of Informants, there is no robust
pathway for Villains to transition to Paladins in the early periods of
the game, while in the latter ones, if Utopia is achieved, the
reinforcement provided by Informants is no longer present. Thus,
the system is hindered in reaching Utopia and is unable to
maintain any Utopian state achieved; Dystopia eventually prevails.
We now turn to a detailed look at all 16 sessions. Each session
number corresponds to a unique treatment, while sessions with an
‘‘(a)’’ appended represent a replicated session of the same
treatment number. We first present results obtained from sessions
where all four actor strategies were available, then we consider
those where Apathetics or Informants were forbidden, leaving only
three available strategy choices. Each of these subsections is
further subdivided into two parts, which describe the results for
experiments run with Profile A and Profile B, respectively. We
refer throughout to the evolution of strategy types presented in
Figs. 2 and 5, along with the treatment details displayed and
experimental results presented in Table S2.
All Strategies Available
Parameter Profile A. Sessions 1, 1(a), 6, 6(a), 7, 9, and 10 all
use Profile A, have all strategies available, and converge (or appear
as though they will eventually converge) to Utopia. Sessions 1/1(a),
6/6(a), and 7 vary in how they are initialized, and Sessions 9 and
10 enforce a high level of behavioral inertia with different
initializations.
Sessions 1 and 1(a) initialize the population at 90% Villains -
10% Informants for the first 5 periods and both exhibit a large
proportion of Informants and Paladins present as soon as subjects
are allowed to choose their strategies. As these sessions continue
past these initial bursts, the Paladins bolster in numbers as the
number of Informants declines. The trend of a rapid increase of
Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game
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Informants and Paladins in early periods followed by growing
Paladins and dwindling Informants is seen in many sessions. Over
the last five periods, Sessions 1 and 1(a) average at least 70%
Paladins, thus ending in Utopia.
Sessions 6 and 6(a) are unique because they have no
initialization periods. These are the only sessions where, in the
first period, all of the subjects were allowed to select a strategy
type. In both of these sessions, the Informant is the second most
commonly played strategy (behind Paladin) for most periods. In
Session 6, the number of Informants follows an upward trend from
period 1 until period 9, where there are actually more Informants
than Paladins (53% Informants versus 31% Paladins). After period
9, we observe the expected behavior of Paladins growing as
subjects playing the Informant strategy declines. Over the last five
periods, these two sessions average at least 75% Paladins and less
than 10% Villains.
Session 7 initializes the subjects at 60% Villains - 40% Paladins,
and behaves similarly to Sessions 6 and 6(a). Initial conditions were
chosen closer to Utopia here than in Sessions 1 and 1(a), so it is no
surprise that Session 7 ends in Utopia, and that there is an average
of 79% Paladins over the last five periods.
Sessions 9 and 10 are unique because they enforce a very high
level of inertia, q~0:8, with initializations of 60% Villains - 40%
Paladins and 90% Villains - 10% Informants, respectively. For the
inertia value used, only 20% of the subjects are allowed to change
their strategy each period after the 5 period initialization phase.
We did this to check whether a high level of inertia would affect
the ability of a population to reach Utopia. In Sessions 9 and 10,
we only observe 54% of the subjects playing the Paladin strategy
averaged over the last 5 periods. While this may seem low, the
evolution of strategies pictured in Fig. 5 illustrates an upward trend
in the number of Paladins in both sessions. Because of this, it seems
likely that the population would have converged to a higher level
of Paladins if it had been allowed to continue for more periods.
Allowing only a small percentage of the subjects to change
strategies each period provides a more fine-grained view of the role
Informants play in the emergence of cooperation. This is because
the high level of inertia allows us to better follow the early stage of
the dynamics and to understand how Informants affect the
behavior of a population near Dystopia. Both sessions show
evidence of Informants ‘‘leading’’ the burst of Paladins, but this is
more clearly shown in Session 9. In both sessions, from period 13
until the end of the session, the percentage of Informants is
between 21% and 50%.
Parameter Profile B. Sessions 2, 2(a), 8, and 8(a) all use
Profile B, have all strategies available, and converge toward
Utopia. Sessions 2 and 2(a) are initialized at 90% Villains - 10%
Informants for the first five periods. Under Profile B, the best
response dynamic suggests that this low initial level of Informants
should prevent the transition to Utopia, but the evolution figures
for Session 2 and 2(a) again illustrate the Informant strategy
‘‘leading’’ the Paladin strategy. Within the first two periods after
the initialization period, the percentage of Informants is up to 44%
and 50% in Session 2 and 2(a), respectively. In Session 2, the
percentage of Paladins has spiked at 78% by period 14. The
percentage of Paladins hovers right at, or slightly below, this
Figure 4. Strategy transition diagrams from Session 1 (top figures) and Session 3 (bottom figures), in both early (left figures) and
late (right figures) periods. Apathetics have been ignored, as they played a negligible role. The sizes of arrows and circles represent the number of
occasions in which subjects allowed to choose their strategy made the indicated transition or continued with their current strategy, respectively.
These raw counts are indicated in parentheses near each arrow and circle, with accompanying percentages.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061458.g004
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number for the remainder of the experiment. Session 2(a) did not
quickly adopt such a high percentage of Paladins, but we conclude
that Session 2(a) was close to converging to Utopia. This is mainly
because of this session’s consistently high conviction rate, r. By
period 6, Session 2(a) has a conviction rate of 67%, and r stays
above this number for the remainder of the session. With such a
high conviction rate, it is likely that more periods of play would
Figure 5. Strategy evolutions for 14 of the 16 experimental sessions. Results for the remaining two sessions are displayed in Fig. 2. In all
cases, Paladins are red circles, Apathetics are blue squares, Informants are orange triangles, and Villains are green diamonds.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061458.g005
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have led to most non-Paladin strategies switching to non-stealing
strategies, most likely Paladins.
Sessions 8 and 8(a) are the same as Sessions 2 and 2(a), except
that they are initialized for the first five periods with 60% Villains -
40% Paladins. Since we observed Sessions 2 and 2(a) converge to
Utopia, we would expect that an initialization closer to Utopia
would produce the same result. This is what we observe from
Sessions 8 and 8(a). Session 8 exhibits similar behavior as Session
2(a), in that, while the system only has an average of 44% Paladins
over the last five periods, the reporting rate is very high: 76% over
the last five periods. If more periods had been played, it is likely
that we would have observed subjects switching to non-stealing
strategies, most likely Paladins. Session 8(a) displays a steady rise in
Paladins and an average reporting rate of 91% over the last five
periods.
Three Strategies Available
Parameter Profile A. Sessions 3 and 3(a) do not allow the
Informant strategy, and are of primary interest because they are
the only sessions under parameter Profile A that do not converge
(or are not on a clear path to converge) to Utopia. Both sessions
are initialized near Dystopia (90% Villains - 10% Paladins) for the
first five periods and average over 55% Villains over the last five
periods. In comparison, the highest percentage of Villains in any of
the 12 sessions that converge to Utopia is 18% (Session 9). The
evolution of the strategy types gives credence to the theory that
Informants play a role in stabilizing Utopia. The lack of a pro-
reporting criminal type (Informant) causes instability for the
players in coordinating on non-criminal behavior. This is seen in
both sessions, but more clearly in Session 3, where the percentage
of Paladins jumps up to 72% in periods 8 and 9 before that
number plummets down to 27% in period 13 and down to 6% in
period 20. Session 3(a) displays similar behavior with a jump of
Paladins to 63% in period 7 and a sharp decline in the next period
to 38%. The proportion of Paladins in Session 3(a) hovers around
33% for the remaining periods. Without the Informant strategy
available to stabilize the initial burst of Paladins, the number of
Paladins falls and the number of Villains rises.
Session 5 is the only treatment that restricts the set of possible
strategies while still including the Informant strategy. This
treatment was used to test if the Apathetic strategy played an
analogous role to that of the Informant. The Apathetic and
Informant strategies are theoretically analogous, in that they are
both hybrid strategies that mix defection and cooperation. This
theoretical similarity is not illustrated in the experimental results.
The fundamental difference between the Informant and Apathetic
strategies is clearly seen when examining the frequency at which
each of these strategies were chosen in the experiments. When
only counting the periods where subjects were allowed to choose
strategies (not in the initialization periods or restricted by
behavioral inertia), the Informant strategy was chosen much more
often than the Apathetic strategy. In the 15 sessions when the
Apathetic strategy was available (all sessions other than Session 5),
subjects only selected it 7.6% of the time. Additionally, there were
53 periods out of a possible 343 where no one in the session was
playing the Apathetic strategy even though it was available.
Comparatively, in the 12 sessions when the Informant strategy was
available, subjects selected it 21.4% of the time, and there was only
one observed period out of 270 where no one selected the
Informant strategy. This happened in Session 8(a) on period 25,
where there were 96% Paladins. In Session 5, we observe similar
results to other treatments that do allow the Apathetic strategy: an
initial boom of Informants and Paladins, followed by a continuing
upward trend of Paladins with a downward trend of Informants.
Session 5 provides evidence that the Informant and Apathetic
strategies are not analogous hybrid strategies to one another, and
that, indeed, there is something unique about the Informant
strategy.
Parameter Profile B. Sessions 4 and 4(a) both initialize the
population at 90% Villains - 10% Paladins, do not allow the
Informant strategy, and converge to Dystopia. These sessions are
crucial in illustrating the vital role of the Informant in leading to
the emergence to cooperation. While there is an initial ‘‘burst’’ of
Paladins in the first periods after initialization, it is not as dramatic
as the burst in Sessions 3 and 3(a). In period 6, Sessions 4 and 4(a)
experience a jump in Paladins to 38% and 27%, respectively. Both
sessions experience a dwindling or stagnation in the percentage of
Paladins after this period for the rest of the session. Session 4(a)
exhibits another small burst of Paladins in periods 17 and 18 at
41%, but on average, both sessions report low numbers of Paladins
toward the end of the session. Over the last five periods of Session
4, only 12% of subjects are playing the Paladin strategy compared
to 73% choosing the Villain strategy. Over the last five periods of
Session 4(a), only 25% of subjects are playing the Paladin strategy,
and 60% are playing the Villain strategy.
Discussion
To summarize, we find experimental evidence that the
Informant strategy, which allows actors to defect by committing
crimes but cooperate by assisting in the punishment of other
criminals, is critical for the emergence of overall cooperation in an
adversarial setting. In our experiments, Utopia is always
converged upon when the Informant strategy is available and
never converged upon when it is not, regardless of parameter
profiles. The Informant strategy is also found to be essential for
keeping the system in Utopia once it is reached. Overall, our
results constitute new evidence that transitioning from a high
crime to low crime society may require successful cultivation of
actors that both commit crimes and cooperate with authorities.
It is instructive to compare our findings with other research on
the emergence of cooperation. The robustness of our findings is
supported by prior theoretical work [31,32] on spatial public
goods games containing four strategies analogous to those
considered here, in which ‘‘punishing defectors’’ (the analog of
Informants) can help stabilize cooperative states, though only
under very small regions of parameter space. Unlike the
commonly studied social dilemma settings with punishment, the
adversarial setting we study does not manifest a second-order free-
rider problem in which the decision to punish or not is in itself a
social dilemma. Because the conviction probability r is increasing
in the number of reporters, the second-order punishment game is
in fact a coordination game where the expected cost of reporting
vanishes as the proportion of reporters approaches one, i.e., as the
system approaches Utopia [27]. Consequently, our adversarial
setting is more similar to works in which coordination fosters
punishment [2,33], than to those in which the cost of punishment
is direct and independent of the punishment decisions of others
[34]. Our results thus complement prior evidence that coordinated
punishments can help both the emergence and sustenance of
cooperation, albeit in a newly studied, directly adversarial setting.
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